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Indonesia’s ﬁnancial sector has two paradoxes: (i) Indonesia has been a global leader in microﬁ-
nance for the past 25 years, but access to microﬁnance services is declining; and (ii) Indonesia’s
commercial banks are liquid, solvent, and proﬁtable, and the Indonesian economy has been doing
well over the past decade, but small and medium enterprises are facing a credit crunch. Although
Indonesia is underbanked, most commercial banks have been unresponsive to unmet effective
demand. The behavior of banks has been in their own short-term best interests, primarily because
of the unintended consequences of Indonesia’s ﬁnancial sector reregulation after the East Asian
crisis and contradictory monetary policies, which have produced a prudentially sound but inefﬁ-
cient, narrow, and homogenized banking oligopoly. Indonesia should not respond to ﬁnancial
exclusion by artiﬁcially pumping out and administratively allocating more credit. Instead, it should
promulgate smart regulation so that banks maintain their sound risk management without pursu-
ing noncompetitive and noninclusive business practices.
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1. The Twin Paradoxes of Indonesia’s Financial Sector
The ﬁnancial sector in Indonesia is currently characterized by two perplexing paradoxes:
1 AlthoughIndonesiahasbeenagloballeaderinmicroﬁnanceoutreachandinnovation
for the past 25 years, access to microﬁnance services is now declining.
2 Although Indonesia’s commercial banks are liquid, solvent, and proﬁtable, and the
Indonesian economy has been doing quite well over the past decade, small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) are now facing a credit crunch.
In Section 2, we demonstrate that contrary to popular perceptions, Indonesia is under-
banked, especially for microﬁnance and SME ﬁnance. This is true whether assessed
nationally by examining macro ﬁgures of ﬁnancial depth,or determined at the household
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Twelfth Asian Economic Policy Review
Conference on the theme of “Developments in Asian Finance” on May 20, 2011 in Osaka. The
authors are grateful to the participants for their useful comments, particularly the editors and our
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enterprises (MSMEs, or UMKMs, Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah in Indonesian).
In Section 3, we look at ﬁnancial exclusion from the supply side. We demonstrate
that despite potentially lucrative unserved or underserved markets, both microﬁnance
institutions (MFIs) and mainstream commercial banks, in choosing to invest their
resources elsewhere, are acting rationally in response to perverse incentives created by
the current monetary policy and regulatory regime of Bank Indonesia (BI, the central
bank).
In Section 4, we examine this disabling rather than enabling regulatory context in
depth. We focus in particular on the way the government has unintentionally created
barriers to outreach and innovation for MFIs, as well as generated incentives for com-
mercial banks to forsake SME ﬁnance in favor of consumer ﬁnance and alternative
nonloan investments in an environment with signiﬁcant barriers to competition.
In Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of the challenges of deregulation,
reregulation, and smart regulation, and offer recommendations for mitigating counter-
productive monetary policies and past regulatory failures without creating other perverse
incentives for MSME institutions.
2. Unmet Effective Demand for Financial Services
Indonesia is clearly underbanked by standard measures of ﬁnancial depth.This is of great
concern to the government in light of the voluminous literature on the relationship
between ﬁnancial sector development and economic growth. While policymakers do not
want a repeat of the credit-fueled asset bubbles that preceded the 1997–1998 East Asian
ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent collapse of Indonesia’s banking system, they are con-
cerned that lack of access to ﬁnancial services is hampering both the rate and equity of
Indonesia’s economic growth.
Using the latest version of the Financial Structure Dataset presented in Beck et al.
(2010) and updated in November 2010, not only is the size of Indonesia’s ﬁnancial sector
considerably smaller than comparable countries, but it has shrunk signiﬁcantly from
pre-East Asian crisis levels as a share of the nation’s economy. Table 1 shows that liquid
liabilities, bank deposits, and both private credit and assets of deposit money banks have
all declined as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) since 1999,and in 2009 were
generally lower than India,Pakistan,the Philippines,and Thailand (lower middle-income
countries); Malaysia (an Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] upper middle-
income country); and the USA (a high-income country).
1
The International Monetary Fund’s Financial Access Survey (IMF, 2010) contains
similar ﬁgures for Indonesia: in 2009, outstanding loans from commercial banks were
24% of GDP, and outstanding deposits with commercial banks were 33% of GDP.
2 The
above-cited ﬁgures focus on banks because four-ﬁfths of Indonesia’s formal ﬁnancial
system assets are held by banks.
However, physical access to formal ﬁnancial institutions does not appear to be a
signiﬁcant constraint. In the World Bank’s nationwide survey on ﬁnancial access in
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3 95% of the respondents characterized physical accessibility of banking facili-
tiesas“convenient”or“veryconvenient.”
4Thisisconsistentwiththesteadyriseinnumber
of ﬁnancialinstitutionofﬁcesandotheroutletsshowninTable 2despitethesteadydecline
in total private banks (see section 4 for a discussion of the government’s policy to
consolidate the banking sector).
Indonesia is still underbanked even when nonbank ﬁnancial institutions are
included, based on the results of the World Bank (2010) household survey. Although
savings were the ﬁnancial service in greatest demand, and 50% of households save at
formal ﬁnancial institutions, only an additional 18% saved at informal institutions,
leaving one-third of households that said they did not save at all. On the credit side,
while just 17% of households had loans from banks and another 43% borrowed from
a variety of nonbank sources, there were still 40% who did not borrow at all. Access
should not be confused with utilization, nor should all exclusion be deemed involun-
tary, but of the 40% who had no loans, only one-ﬁfth said it was because they
intentionally chose not to borrow. In contrast, 79% of households that did not save said
it was because they had no money, but this implies that they might still save in tradi-
tional noncash forms, such as livestock and jewelry, in keeping with the belief that poor
families cannot afford not to save.
5
There are additional indications of unmet effective demand for ﬁnancial services
today in Indonesia, particularly regarding loans for MSMEs.
6
At the macro level, since 2004 GDP has steadily grown between 5% and 7%, inﬂation
has been contained to single digits for most of this period, and the exchange rate has
remained stable at between Rp8,500 and Rp9,500 to the US dollar most of the time.
7
Unlike the period in Indonesia following the East Asian crisis described in Agung et al.
(2001) or the current situation in the USA in the aftermath of the global economic crisis,
there should be many creditworthy MSMEs amid a relatively strong economy – the
traditional banker’s rationale for a credit crunch, fear of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in
a weak economy, rings hollow in this context.
Atthemicrolevel,severalﬁeldsurveysoverthepastdecadebesidesWorldBank(2010)
indicate that lack of access to credit for viable MSMEs wishing to borrow is a signiﬁcant
constraint to their development. These include Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s (BRI’s) 2001
nationwide stratiﬁed purposive sample survey of 1469 households in 10 provinces
(Rosengardet al.,2001)andits2002follow-upsurveyof 1438householdsinsixprovinces
(Johnston & Morduch, 2008); BI’s 2005 survey of 11,000 MSMEs in 11 provinces (Bank
Indonesia, 2005b); and the World Bank’s 2006 Rural Investment Climate Survey of 2549
nonfarm enterprises and 2782 households in six rural kabupaten (districts) located
throughout the country (World Bank, 2006; 2007).
This unmet effective demand had been well documented and has been acknowl-
edged by the government, giving rise to BI’s vigorously promoted Financial Inclusion
Program (Program Perluasan Akses Kepada Lembaga Keuangan). Nonetheless, the
response of banks to expand MSME lending has been underwhelming. The next section
explores the capacity and willingness of banks to broaden their coverage of the MSME
sector.
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Now is a wonderful time to own a bank in Indonesia. Banks are liquid, solvent, and
proﬁtable.
In contrast, now is not an opportune time to seek ﬁnancing for your MSME. Hence
the common refrain of Indonesian entrepreneurs: “If the banks are doing so well, why
can’t I get a loan?”
At ﬁrst glance,it appears that BI has achieved its objective of improving the soundness
of the banking sector without impinging on the intermediation mission of banks.
As shown in Figure 1, both liquidity and solvency are indeed very good: commercial
banks have doubled their loan to deposit ratio (LDR) from a very low 40% to a prudent
band between 70% and 80%, and their capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has hovered around
20% since 2004 – this is 150% more than the 8% regulatory minimum and double the
Basel III requirement of 10.5% in minimum total capital plus conservation buffer, effec-
tive in 2019.
8 The stability of Indonesia’s banking system can also be seen by its extremely
high z-score, which was 12.2 at the end of 2009. In contrast, the US z-score was 2.3, while
Thailand and Pakistan have z-scores of 5.3. Even Malaysia, often used as the benchmark
for Southeast Asia, had a lower z-score at 8.0.
9
Consistent with a higher but not excessive LDR, credit has also expanded almost
sixfold since 2002, as shown in Figure 2, implying that the banks are performing their
intermediation function without fueling asset bubbles (see earlier macroeconomic indi-
cators). NPLs have also declined to approximately 3%, but reported NPLs should be
viewed with caution in light of Bank Century’s collapse after extended misrepresentation
of its true ﬁnancial condition to BI (Nasution, 2010).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
CAR
LDR
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 1 Loan to deposit ratios (LDRs) and capital adequacy ratios (CARs) for Indonesian
commercial banks.
Source: Bank Indonesia.
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on assets has been between 2.5% and 3.5% since 2006,much higher than the conventional
range of 1.0–1.5% of banks in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the
USA.
But these aggregated ﬁgures are misleading and do not accurately reﬂect the MSME
creditmarkettodayinIndonesia.Forexample,asshowninTable 3,twoof thethreelargest
banks have less than half of their assets in loans,and only two of the 10 largest banks have
more than 70% of their assets in loans; Bank Central Asia has one-ﬁfth of its assets in BI
certiﬁcates (SBIs), and Bank Mandiri has one quarter of its assets in government bonds.
-
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 2 Rupiah and foreign exchange credit from commercial banks (bank umum) and Peoples
Credit Bank (BPRs) in Indonesia; trillions of rupiah.
Source: Bank Indonesia.
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 3 Return on assets for commercial banks (bank umum) in Indonesia.
Source: Bank Indonesia.
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control inﬂation, as indicated in Figure 4, and the banks have responded accordingly. BI
demonstrated its intention to continue these practices when it increased the minimum
reserve requirements of commercial banks in November 2010 from 5% to 8%.While this
might be good for monetary policy and bank proﬁtability, it has contributed to the
crowding out of MSME access to credit. As discussed in Thee and Negara (2010), it also
reﬂects a fundamental macroeconomic management contradiction, namely having costly
and incompatible monetary and exchange rate policies – BI is trying to maintain a low
inﬂation rate without allowing the rupiah to appreciate.
The disaggregation of bank income presented in Table 4 conﬁrms the rationality of
banks’ responses to central bank incentives:given that most bank income still comes from
interest earned,and that between one-ﬁfth and one-third of interest income for six of the
eightlargestbankscomesfrominvestmentinterestratherthanloaninterest,theattraction
of SBIs and government bonds to banks is clear, especially in light of the higher transac-
tion costs and greater risk of MSME loans.
Although Indonesian banks have found it often more attractive to place their funds at
other banks and to invest in government instruments than to make loans, total credit has
nonetheless been growing at an annual rate of nearly 20% (about 14% in real terms) since
2002 (see Figure 2).Yet MSMEs claim they are ﬁnding it increasingly difﬁcult to get loans
fortheirbusinesses.Istherereallyacreditcrunch?If so,whyaren’tlargebusinessesequally
affected?
Large businesses are different from MSMEs in terms of economic dominance and
political inﬂuence. Large businesses mobilize themselves to ensure they have access to
ﬁnancing because they are few in number, rich in resources, and incentivized to lobby for
beneﬁts that are direct and concentrated. In contrast, MSMEs are much more difﬁcult to
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 4 Total Sertiﬁkat Bank Indonesia (SBIs); in trillions of rupiah.
Source: Bank Indonesia Certiﬁcate.
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diverse group for which the beneﬁts of collective action would be diffuse and the potential
for free riding considerable.
Large business lending is also different from MSME lending. Large business loans are
conventional products that constitute the core business of banks,and thus are not likely to
be affected much by the reregulation described in section 4. In contrast, MSMEs require
the type of innovative products and delivery systems discouraged by Indonesia’s reregu-
lation policies.
These fundamental conceptual differences between large businesses and MSMEs are
supported by quantitative data. The loan portfolios of many of Indonesia’s largest banks
are dominated by loans to large businesses and corporate clients, rather than loans to
MSMEs. For example at the end of 2009, only 15%, 19%, and 20% of the loan portfolios
of Bank Mandiri, BCA, and Bank Negara Indonesia, respectively, were for MSMEs.
10
Once again, however, aggregate ﬁgures do not tell the whole story. As indicated in
Table 5,even though MSM (micro,medium,and small) credit (credit categorized by loan
size and not by borrower) has indeed remained approximately half of all loans since 2005,
further disaggregation of the data by loan use indicates that even credit reported as MSM
loans,used in ofﬁcial documents as a proxy for MSME lending,greatly overstates support
to MSMEs: consumption loans have consistently been half of all MSM credit and two-
thirdsof microandsmallloans.Therehasalsobeenanupscalingof lendingasmicroloans
andsmall-scaleloanshaveswitchedpositionsintermsof theirshareof MSMcredit:micro
loans have dropped from 42.7% to 29.5% of MSM loans, while small-scale loans have
grown from 27.5% to 41.2% of MSM loans.
However, the performance of two of the six largest banks, BRI and Bank Danamon,
has been a notable exception to many of these trends, as virtually the entire portfolio of
Table 4 Interest income composition of Indonesian banks (ranked by total assets) as of September
2010; in trillions of rupiah
Rank Bank Loan interest Investment interest Total interest
1 Bank Mandiri 18.0 70.3% 7.6 29.7% 25.6
2 Bank Rakyat Indonesia 24.4 88.4% 3.2 11.6% 27.6
3 Bank Central Asia 9.8 66.2% 5.0 33.8% 14.8
4 Bank Negara Indonesia 10.9 75.7% 3.5 24.3% 14.4
5 Bank CIMB Niaga 8.0 88.9% 1.0 11.1% 9.0
6 Bank Danamon Indonesia 8.0 75.5% 2.6 24.5% 10.6
7 Pan Indonesia Bank 3.8 71.7% 1.5 28.3% 5.3
8 Bank Internasional Indonesia 3.6 78.3% 1.0 21.7% 4.6
9 Bank Tabungan Negara 4.1 91.1% 0.4 8.9% 4.5
10 Bank Permata (incl. Bank Bali) na na na na na
Source: Financial reports of each bank listed.
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enterprise ﬁnance, these two banks have nevertheless made extensive efforts to serve
low-income households and family businesses.
Since BRI commercialized its micro-banking services in 1983,
11 it has dominated
much of the micro-banking market in Indonesia, and in many places, it is still the sole
formal ﬁnancial institution. For example, the Rosengard et al. (2001) survey found that
12
￿ More than half of the households with viable enterprises
13 that had access to credit
from a ﬁnancial institution received loans exclusively from BRI units,and this number
rose to two-thirds if it also included loans from a BRI unit and/or a BRI branch.
￿ Almost three-quarters of the households with viable enterprises that had access to
savings services from ﬁnancial institutions saved exclusively at BRI units, and this
number rose to 85% if it also included savings at a BRI unit and/or a BRI branch.
The World Bank (2010) survey also found that BRI had the most extensive coverage in
Indonesia:40%of individualswithbankaccountshadtheseaccountsatBRI,and23of the
29 bank ofﬁces at the village level were BRI units.
14
Table 6 provides a snapshot of BRI micro-banking services at the end of 2010,and the
numbers are impressive by both national and international standards: 5.1 million
microloans outstanding totaling Rp71.2 trillion,with NPLs comprising only 1.2% and an
average loan size of just Rp14.0 million; 22.1 million savings accounts totaling Rp89.9
trillion,with an average account size of only Rp4.1 million; total micro-banking proﬁts of
Rp9.1trillion;andanextensivedistributionnetworkof 4649BRIunits,allonline,617BRI
Teras (subunits), and 2437 automated teller machines (ATMs)at BRI units.
While breaking into micro-banking much later than BRI, since 2005, Bank Danamon
has entered what it calls the“self-employed mass market”aggressively and has developed
a large portfolio of microloans through its Danamon Simpan Pinjam (Danamon Savings
and Loan), or DSP ofﬁces: at the end of September 2010, there were 1058 DSPs through-
out Indonesia with 615,000 customers and loans outstanding of Rp14.4 trillion.
15
Although Danamon had several unsuccessful attempts to break into this market in the
past, the catalyst for this latest foray into MSME ﬁnance was a change in ownership in
2003 (Temasek Holdings of Singapore now owns 67.9% of Danamon) and a subsequent
reexamination of potential market opportunities in light of the competitive strengths and
weaknesses of Indonesia’s other large banks. This initiative is still seen as an experiment
within Danamon, and so is under careful scrutiny and is accompanied by considerable
internal debate on its future prospects.
4. Disabling Regulatory Context and Perverse Incentives
Despite the continued impressive performance of BRI in micro-banking and the encour-
aging entry of Danamon into this market, BI’s regulatory policies since the 1997 East
Asian crisis have created fundamental internal problems for BRI’s micro-banking opera-
tions, signiﬁcantly reduced innovation and outreach for ﬁnancial institutions that serve
the economic stratum below the micro-banking market of commercial banks, and gen-
erated strong disincentives for other ﬁnancial institutions to enter both the micro-ﬁnance
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are in addition to the detrimental impact of BI’s monetary policies on MSME ﬁnance
discussed in the previous section.
The 1997 crisis, dubbed Krismon (Krises Moneter, Monetary Crisis) in Indonesia, was
both traumatic and expensive: it destroyed the country’s banking system, and the cost of
recapitalizing Indonesia’s banks totaled 70% of 1999 GDP (Rosengard, 2002).
Thus, BI’s principal objective after Krismon was to ensure that such a collapse would
not happen again. Under its Arsitektur Perbankan Indonesia (API, Indonesia Banking
Architecture)program,BIhaspushedforaconsolidationof itsbankingsectorinthebelief
that an administratively determined small number of large,full-service commercial banks
would be safer than a broader and more diverse banking sector resulting from open-
market competition. BI has also allowed the continued operation of numerous Bank
Perkreditan Rakya (BPRs) or Peoples Credit Bank, but these are special license banks with
averyrestrictedscopeof operation(BankIndonesia,2005a).Thus,asindicatedinTable 2,
although the number of bank branches has almost doubled and number of bank ATMs
hastripledsinceKrismon,thenumberof alltypesof bankshasdeclinedconsiderablysince
1997.
As noted in section 3, government recapitalization of the banking sector and BI’s
subsequent API have resulted in banks that are predominantly liquid, solvent, and prof-
itable. Indonesia’s prudentially sound banking sector also shielded it from most of the
direct impacts of the current global economic crisis,so BI feels vindicated in its regulatory
policies (Bank Indonesia, 2010b).
But these policies have also created what the World Bank and International Finance
Corporation (2009) describe as a“medium concentration oligopoly”:“oligopoly”because
whether in terms of assets,credit outstanding,or third-party funds,approximately half of
the banking system’s total is held by the ﬁve largest banks, two-thirds by the 10 largest
banks, and four-ﬁfths by the 20 largest banks (Table 7);“medium concentration”because
no single bank has greater than a 15% share,and only three banks have greater than a 10%
share.
Nevertheless, an oligopoly is still an oligopoly, regardless of degree of concentration,
and by deﬁnition,provides opportunities for collusion in pursuit of greater proﬁts.There
are several indications that this consolidated banking structure has indeed generated an
acute failure of competition that has fostered an inefﬁcient, rent-seeking oligopoly.
16
For example, according to BI Governor Darmin Nasution, the average operating ratio
(operating cost to operating income) and net interest margin (NIM) of Indonesian banks
are 82% and 6%,respectively,while the operating ratio and NIM of banks in neighboring
countries are from 33% to 73% and 2% to 5%, respectively (Samboh, 2011). This is
conﬁrmed by the data presented in Table 8.
Thee and Negara (2010; p. 301) believe that Indonesia has the highest NIM in this
ASEAN comparison mainly because of inefﬁcient provincial and state bank management,
as these banks have NIMs of 9.0% and 6.3%, respectively; in contrast, the NIM of private
domestic foreign exchange banks is 5.3%, joint banks 3.8%, and foreign banks 3.5%.
Nonetheless, all of these NIMs are still relatively high, and the NIMs of Indonesian
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nonforeign exchange banks at 9.5%.
17
Thepicturebecomesmoredisconcertingwhenbankspreadsaredisaggregatedbyloan
product. Keeping in mind Indonesia’s low inﬂation rate and concomitant low cost of
funds,aswellasthebanks’relianceonconsumerﬁnance,theinterestratesshowinTable 9
appear to be exorbitant, ranging from 2.7% to 4.5% per month, regardless of bank
ownership (state, private, foreign).
Another possible indicator of failure of competition in Indonesia’s banking sector is
the extremely high price to earnings ratio (PER)
18 of the 10 largest banks. Table 10 shows
Table 7 Indonesia’s banking oligopoly
Bank concentration
metric 2008 (%) 2009 (%) Change (%)
Total assets
5 largest banks 50.0 51.6 3.3
10 largest banks 64.1 65.4 2.0
20 largest banks 79.0 79.5 0.6
Total credit outstanding
5 largest banks 47.3 49.1 3.8
10 largest banks 62.9 64.5 2.5
20 largest banks 78.4 78.8 0.5
Total third party funds
5 largest banks 51.6 53.5 3.7
10 largest banks 63.4 66.0 4.0
20 largest banks 77.0 79.6 3.4
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Bank Indonesia (2010a).
Table 8 Efﬁciency of banks in ASEAN
Country
NIM (%)
2009
Operating ratio (%)
2006
Indonesia 5.9 73.9
Philippines 3.9 71.7
Thailand 3.4 66.4
Vietnam 3.4 49.2
Malaysia 3.0 49.6
Singapore 1.8 45.1
Source: Thee and Negara (2010) for NIM; BankScope and Infobank Research Bureau for
Operating Ratio.
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banking industry standard of between 8% and 10%. High PERs reﬂect market expecta-
tions of signiﬁcant growth prospects,but it is unclear whether this is because shareholders
perceive competitive advantages or because they expect to proﬁt from the continued
reaping of monopoly rents.
19
Two other indicators of lack of competition in Indonesia’s banking system are API’s
barriers to entry and exit. Senior BI ofﬁcials have conceded that it is virtually impossible
Table 9 Credit card monthly interest rates for Indonesian banks in June 2009
Bank Interest rate (% monthly)
Bank Rakyat Indonesia 2.7
Bank Negara Indonesia 3.0
Bank Mandiri 3.5
Bank Bukopin 3.5
Bank Permata 4.5
Bank Central Asia 3.3
Bank UOB Buana 3.5
Citibank 3.5
HSBC 3.3
Note: These rates are indicative rather than directly comparable because the speciﬁcs of each
bank’s credit card facilities differ.
Source: Infobank Special Edition 2009.
Table 10 Price/Earnings Ratios for Indonesian banks in 2010
Rank Bank PER Q3-2010 PER annualized
1 Bank Mandiri 19.9 14.9
2 Bank Rakyat Indonesia 19.4 14.6
3 Bank Central Asia 23.5 17.6
4 Bank Negara Indonesia 18.1 13.6
5 Bank CIMB Niaga 23.7 17.8
6 Bank Danamon Indonesia 23.1 17.3
7 Pan Indonesia Bank 23.5 17.6
8 Bank Internasional Indonesia 83.8 62.8
9 Bank Tabungan Negara 20.7 15.5
10 Bank Permata (incl. Bank Bali) 16.5 12.4
Source: Financial statements of each bank, calculated by Indonesia Finance Today (IFT) Research
Department.
PER, price to earnings ratio.
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bank.
20 It is also quite difﬁcult to fail: BI has closed just one bank in the last 5 years when
it revoked the business license of Bank IFI in April 2009 (BI Governor Decree no. 11/19/
KEP.GBI/2009).
21 This creates a comfortable environment for existing large banks to
exploit their market domination at the expense of potential competitors. It also presents
BI with yet another unanticipated dilemma: the largest banks are now both too big to
regulate and too big to fail. Moreover, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) have found
that“systemic size is an unmitigated bad”because systemically large banks reduce return
without lowering risk, and are often too big to save.
In addition to creating an inefﬁcient, rent-seeking oligopoly, BI’s API has greatly
concentrated credit risk. Today, most Indonesian banks look alike, offering the same
products at the same prices in the same locations to the same markets. Not only does this
increase rather than mitigate systemic risk, but it also exacerbates the exclusionary nature
of Indonesia’s banking system.
As described in detail in Rosengard et al. (2007), this phenomenon can be seen most
clearly in the impact of BI’s regulatory regime on two types of MFIs that serve primarily
rural and semi-urban markets: village-owned microﬁnance institutions (VMFIs) operat-
ing exclusively at the village (desa) level, and local government-owned microﬁnance
institutions (GMFIs) operating at the subdistrict (kecamatan) and village (desa) levels.
22
VMFIs were Indonesia’s original MFIs established in the 1890s as village banks (bank
desa) and village paddy banks (lumbung desa) to provide savings and credit facilities for
villages in Java and Madura. VMFIs are owned and operated by the villagers they serve,
nowunderthetechnicalsupervisionof BRIonbehalf of BI.Thereisnoconﬂictof interest
with the BRI units because BRI unit coverage does not extend to the village level. VMFI
clients are also much poorer than BRI unit customers: at the end of May 2003, the 4518
active VMFIs had Rp186.8 billion in loans outstanding to 438,938 borrowers, with an
averageloansizeof Rp426,000;theyalsohad524,671saverswithRp35.3billioninsavings,
for an average savings account of Rp67,000. VMFI loan interest rates are roughly double
those of the BRI units, and their loans are usually for 12 weeks with weekly payments, as
opposed to 1–2 year loans with monthly installments at the BRI units.
GMFIs were modeled after the VMFIs to serve villages without VMFIs. Established
by about a third of Indonesia’s provincial governments, GMFIs are autonomous
nonbank ﬁnancial institutions headquartered at the subdistrict level that send motor-
cycle teams to villages on traditional market days. Their products and pricing are similar
to VMFIs.
A combination of the 1992 Banking Law
23 and API have frozen the development of
VMFIs, and compelled many GMFIs to consolidate operations at higher levels of gov-
ernment and to favor payroll deduction loans for salaried workers over business loans to
microenterprises. Both the 1992 Banking Law and API treat VMFIs and GMFIs as BPRs
despite their very different products, clients, and service areas. Thus, although badan
kredit desa (BKDs) were granted a collective BPR license and exempted from some BPR
regulatory requirements,
24 the status of VMFIs is still unclear, especially regarding their
savings mobilization activities. GMFIs are supposed to convert to BPRs, meaning they
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operational norms that undercut their effectiveness as MFIs since BI treats BPRs essen-
tially as small commercial banks. Roughly one-quarter of GMFIs have converted to
BPRs (or other permitted institutions such as cooperatives),
25 while the remainder have
either closed or continue to operate with ambiguous legal status.
The consequence for GMFIs is to try to look like other banks so they: (i) consolidate
at the district or provincial level in the spirit that larger banks are better banks; (ii) offer
traditional loan products like payroll deduction loans to salaried workers, because the
regulator knows and understands these credit products; and (iii) close village posts for
expediency to accommodate the ﬁrst two operational changes. As BPRs, they also come
under the direct supervision of BI, which greatly undermines and sometimes completely
severs provincial government oversight and technical support. This is not the objective
of BI’s regulatory regime, but BI is largely unaware of these unintended consequences;
the decrease in microenterprise lending is not evident because loans are reported to BI by
loan size, not loan use or client, and the closing of village posts, which are classiﬁed as
subbranch ofﬁces, is not tracked in BI aggregated statistics.
Just as BI’s well-intentioned policies to strengthen the banking system have decreased
innovation and access for village-level microﬁnance services, its equally well-intentioned
policies to force commercial banks to lend more to MSMEs have also been counterpro-
ductive. BI has essentially restored several components of the ﬁnancial repression it had
phased out with the comprehensive banking reform of the 1980s
26 and the BI reform of
Law no. 23/1999.
27
WhenIndonesialiberalizedandderegulateditsbankingsystem,removinginterestrate
ceilings, credit allocation requirements, controls on expansion of branch networks, and
barriers to entry, it ended most of its directed lending. The main exception to this was
special“program credit”by which BI funneled its money (likuiditas BI) through commer-
cialbanksforprioritysectorssuchasMSMEs.Theseweresubsidizedcreditprograms,and
the banks served as channeling rather than executing institutions so they bore little,if any,
of the credit risk for these loans.
Under the postcrisis central banking law, BI is no longer allowed to implement such
programs. Instead, it is supposed to focus entirely on monetary policy – even banking
supervision is to be moved to a new regulatory agency, the Financial Services Authority
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan).
28
Nonetheless,thegovernment,viaMinistryof Financeregulations,istryingtogetBIto
indirectly dictate which banks should lend to, and at what price, through programs such
as Kredit Usaha Rakyat, Peoples Business Credit (KUR).
29 Kredit Usaha Kecil, Small Busi-
nessCredit(KUK)isreminiscentof BI’sKUKprogramof the1990sunderwhichallbanks
wererequiredtolend20%of theirtotalcredittomicroenterprises.KUKwasfatallyﬂawed
conceptually and a dismal failure operationally: many banks had no internal mandate,
desire, or expertise to engage in MSME ﬁnance, so were extremely creative in both
“representing” their loan portfolios so they appeared to be in compliance with KUK
requirementsandinchannelingKUKloansthroughotherﬁnancialinstitutions.Although
KURdoesnothavespeciﬁccreditallocation quotas,KUR loans are to be made to“feasible
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at below market rates and with partial external loan guarantees.
30
The government’s moral suasion has not been very effective in compelling private
banks with successful market-based MSME credit facilities such as Danamon to engage in
KURlending,butithascreatedchallengesforstatebankswithsuchproducts,suchasBRI.
It places BRI in the untenable position of being forced to offer the same loan product at
the same location to the same clientele at two different prices. Not only does this appear
to be inequitable,as the lower interest rates are only for new borrowers,but it undermines
the commercial sustainability of micro-banking operations and offers opportunities for
corruption through interest rate arbitrage.
Furthermore,BIwillrequirecommercialbankstoincreasetheirLDRstobetween78%
and 100% by March 2011, and will impose higher minimum reserve requirements on
bankswhoseLDRisnotwithinthisrange.
31If thebankscomply,theycouldincreasecredit
without lending more to MSMEs, potentially fueling speculative asset bubbles like in the
mid-1990s or overcrediting consumers as Korean banks did in the aftermath of the East
Asian crisis.If the banks do not comply,it will simply increase their cost of lending.Either
way, it is unlikely this will meet BI’s primary objective of encouraging more loans to
MSMEs.
Otherexamplesof governmentinterventioninthecreditallocationdecisionsof banks
istheMinistryof State-OwnedEnterprises’PKBL(ProgramKemitraanBadanUsahaMilik
Negara dengan Usaha Kecil dan Program Bina Lingkungan,SOE-Small Enterprise Partner-
ship Program and Environmental Protection Program)
32 and BI’s new MSME Business
Plan regulation.
33 Under PKBL, all SOEs must allocate 4% of after-tax proﬁts to MSME
credit and environmental protection programs as part of their corporate social responsi-
bility requirements with many restrictions on the credit component of PKBL. Under the
MSME regulation, all banks must submit to BI a plan for MSME lending by sector,
province, and credit scheme.
5. Deregulation, Reregulation, and Smart Regulation
Inthe1980s,Indonesiaderegulateditsbankingsystemfasterthanitdevelopedthetechnical
capacityandpoliticalwilltooverseebankswithnewlyacquiredfreedom.Itpaiddearlyfor
thismistakewithKrismoninthelate1990s.Indonesiarespondedbyreregulatingitsbanking
systemafterthecrisiswiththeintroductionofAPI,includinganadministrativelyimposed
freeze on the establishment of new banks and consolidation of existing banks, as well as a
return to directed lending. This has resulted in prudentially sound but inefﬁcient and
noninclusive banks. Today’s challenge is to ﬁnd a balance between these two approaches.
The government is convinced that banking reform by administrative ﬁat will produce
faster results at a lower risk than waiting for behavioral change spurred by market-based
incentives. Thus, with each disappointing outcome, the government issues an even stron-
ger directive to force banks to lend to MSMEs: from the moral suasion of KUR, to the
required preparation of detailed MSME business plans, to the mandatory higher LDRs
andthreatof greaterminimumreserverequirementsfornoncompliance.Thisapproachis
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credit with central bank funds is directed credit with third party deposits.
Section 2 demonstrates that there clearly is an unmet effective demand from MSMEs
forﬁnancingfacilities,andsection3showsthatmostcommercialbankscertainlyhavenot
takenadvantageof thismarketopportunity.Butbankbehaviorhasbeenarationale,albeit
undesired,responsetothecurrentregulatoryenvironmentthatisdetailedinsection4and
summarized below:
￿ The government strengthened Indonesia’s commercial banking oligopoly with the
introduction of API, erecting effective barriers to competition: no new banks, con-
solidation of existing banks, and forbearance in dealing with failing banks.
￿ The government also weakened incentives for innovation and outreach at the
micro-banking level and concentrated credit risk by homogenizing the banking
system: mandatory VMFI and GMFI conversion to BPR, weakening or severance of
provincial government oversight and technical support, centralization of operations,
and preference for standard loan products and delivery systems.
￿ The government concurrently pursued monetary policies that reduced loanable
funds at the disposal of banks and provided investment opportunities for this reduced
pool of funds that were more attractive to banks than making loans: high minimum
reserve requirements coupled with issuance of government bonds and SBIs.
￿ Amid concerns of ﬁnancial exclusion,the government also instituted several mea-
suresthatrevertedtopastpracticesof directedlending:KUR,PKBL,andMSMEplans.
￿ Still unsatisﬁed with the banking sector’s response, the government mandated
higher LDRs but continued to pursue a contradictory monetary policy by also raising
minimum reserve requirements to ﬁght inﬂation.
Government recognition that the unintended consequences of its own banking sector
reregulation have created perverse incentives for banks to avoid MSME ﬁnancing is also
the key to addressing this problem. While the government might still wish to use its
control over banking system liquidity to manage money supply despite the drawbacks if
alternative instruments are ineffective, it can still create powerful incentives for banks to
explore new markets such as MSME lending: it can remove barriers to commercial
banking competition to provide a catalyst for SME lending, and it can recognize the need
for nonbank ﬁnancial institutions such as VMFIs and GMFIs for micro-banking and
adapt its regulatory regime accordingly.
Indonesia should not respond to ﬁnancial exclusion by artiﬁcially pumping out and
administratively allocating more credit.Instead,it should promulgate smart regulation so
that banks maintain their sound risk management without pursuing noncompetitive and
noninclusive business practices. The fundamental problem today is not a slow rate of
credit growth, but rather, concentrated composition of lending; increasing the aggregate
level of ﬁnancial intermediation is a longer term challenge best pursued incrementally.
However, even if the government makes these changes, there is still a signiﬁcant
constrainttoMSMElendingbecauseof theperceivedhighrisksandlowreturnsof MSME
ﬁnance. Conventional commercial bankers should indeed be wary of a potentially high
level of NPLs and unsustainable transaction costs in the MSME sector unless they truly
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default resulting from ineffective risk assessment and risk mitigation practices, coupled
with signiﬁcant cost overruns from inappropriate loan products and delivery systems.
Banks often treat MSME loans simply as smaller versions of large loans despite the very
different characteristics of MSMEs and the requisite ﬁnancial model needed to make
serving this market proﬁtable. Slow, centralized decision making based on extensive
analysis of ﬁnancial statements and industry-wide data for a handful of long-term loans
must be replaced by quick,decentralized decision-making based on cash ﬂow analysis and
character assessment for a much larger volume of shorter term loans.
Until banks have a viable model for ﬁnancing MSMEs, they should continue to
approach this market with great caution despite government prodding, especially if they
have attractive alternative uses of their funds such as those described above. But only
competitive pressures to develop new markets provide sufﬁcient incentives for banks to
ﬁgure out how to serve MSMEs in a commercially sustainable way, and forcing banks to
act against their ﬁduciary responsibilities to their owners and depositors is rash and
counterproductive.
Notes
1 The Financial Structure Dataset (FSD) was ﬁrst published in 1999 and presented in both
Beck et al. (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). The complete, updated FSD is
available, together with detailed explanations of all terms and sources used in the FSD at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/FinStructure_
2009.xls
2 The IMF’s Financial Access Survey is available by individual country and in cross-country
format at: http://fas.imf.org/
3 Three thousand three hundred sixty households were surveyed using multistage random sam-
pling with population-weighted selection at each stage.The survey methodology is described in
detail in Annex B of World Bank (2010).
4 World Bank (2010; pp. 13, 50–55).
5 World Bank (2010;pp.55–77).Also,seeAnnexA for a discussion of“access”versus“use,”as well
asof“voluntary”versus“involuntary”exclusion.”Despitethesedistinctions,theWorldBankstill
relies on“use”as a proxy for access at prevailing prices throughout its report, since it is difﬁcult
in practice to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary exclusion.
6 According to Republic of Indonesia (2008),the Government of Indonesia deﬁnes MSMEs based
on net assets or annual turnover: a microenterprise has net assets  Rp50 million or annual
turnover  Rp300 million; a small enterprise has net assets >Rp50 million but Rp500 million
or annual turnover >Rp300 million but Rp2.5 billion; and a medium enterprise has net assets
>Rp500 million but Rp10 billion or annual turnover >Rp2.5 billion but Rp50 billion. In
contrast, according to World Bank (2010, ft. 105), BI deﬁnes MSMEs based on loan size: a
microloan is Rp50 million; a small loan is >Rp50 million but Rp500 million; and a medium
loan is >Rp500 million but Rp5 billion.We use BI deﬁnitions when analyzing bank lending by
loan size.
7 The exchange rate used throughout this paper is Rp9,000 = US$1.00.
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Asian Economic Policy Review © 2011 Japan Center for Economic Research 2938 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) for a detailed explanation of new capital,
leverage,and liquidity requirements,as well as phase-in arrangements and scheduled transition
periods.
9 See theWorld Bank’s FSD for a complete listing of z-scores.According to Beck et al.(2009;p.9),
“The z-score [emphasis in original text] is the ratio of return on assets plus capital-asset-ratio to
thestandarddeviationof returnonassets.If proﬁtsareassumedtofollowanormaldistribution,
it can be shown that the z-score is the inverse of the probability of insolvency. Speciﬁcally, z
indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on assets has to drop below its
expected value before equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent...T h u s ,ah i g h e rz-score
indicates that the bank is more stable.”
10 Data compiled by Bank Indonesia and Ekoﬁn Konsulindo.
11 See Patten and Rosengard (1991) for a detailed account of the commercialization of BRI’s
micro-banking services.
12 Rosengard et al. (2001; table 12).
13 A “viable enterprise” is an enterprise that would qualify for a BRI unit loan according to the
enumerator, who was either a BRI unit manager (kaunit) or BRI unit loan ofﬁcer (mantri).
14 World Bank (2010; p. 50).
15 Figures from Ali Yong, Director of Credit, Bank Danamon.
16 See The Economist (2010) for a summary of what it describes as the “proﬁts puzzle” of
Indonesian banks.
17 All ﬁgures used in this NIM disaggregation are from July 2010; the total for all banks is 5.8.
18 PER is calculated as the ratio of the market price per share to the earnings per share.In Asia the
denominator(earnings)is“trailing”soistheactualearningsof thepreviousfourquarters,while
the numerator (price) is a market-based expectation of future proﬁtability.
19 In contrast, low PERs indicate a risk premium for potential future instability or declining
competitiveness.
20 This conclusion is based on both plentiful anecdotal data and extensive discussions the authors
held with senior BI ofﬁcials in January 2011.
21 Even this closure was quite late and relatively insigniﬁcant, as Bank IFI had been under BI
intensive supervision since 2002 and when closed, its total assets were 0.01% of total banking
assets (http://cpns.beasiswaz.com/bank-iﬁ).
22 Most GMFIs are referred to as LDKPs (lembaga dana kredit pedesaan,village credit institutions)
and most VMFIs are called BKDs (badan kredit desa, village credit bodies).
23 Law 7/1992 on Banking.
24 World Bank (2010; box 14).
25 World Bank (2010; box 14).
26 See McLeod (1996) for a detailed account of banking deregulation in Indonesia. See Patten and
Rosengard (1991) and Charitonenko and Afwan (2003) for the impact of banking deregulation
on the development of micro-banking in Indonesia.
27 Amended by Law no. 3/2004 and Law no. 6/2009.
28 See McLeod (2011) for a discussion of the uncertainty that this will ever happen,and the pitfalls
if it does.
29 Ministry of Finance Regulations no.135/PMK.05/2008 and no.189/PMK.05/2010 on the Micro
Credit Guarantee Facility.
30 At present, interest rates are 22% for loans <Rp20 million and 14% for loans from Rp20
million to Rp500 million, versus current market rates of roughly 33–90% and 17–18%,
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Asian Economic Policy Review © 2011 Japan Center for Economic Research 294respectively; guarantees are from 70% to 80% of the loan, depending on sector and borrower
(e.g. higher percentage for overseas workers and agriculture).
31 Thee and Negara (2010, p. 296); Manurung and Ahlstrand (2010).
32 Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises Regulation No. PER-05/MBU/2007.
33 Bank Indonesia Regulation no. 12/21/PBI/2010.
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